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DEMOCRATIC RESTRAINTS UPON THE
POLICE"
FRED E. INBAU
To place the subject of democratic restraints upon the police in its proper perspective, I would like to start out by suggesting that much of today's concern about the police stems from a
confusion in the minds of many persons with respect to two different functions of the police. One function is the traditional
one of the prevention and detection of conventional crimes and
the apprehension of conventional criminals; the other is the
role that the police have played, or rather been forced to play,
in the controversy over the civil rights of minority groups.
Suggestive of this confusion is the fact that in recent years
there have been considerably fewer instances of physical abuses
of criminal suspects, and less intrusions upon their constitutional rights and privileges than ever before. For instance, the
so-called 3rd degree is a rare occurrence today; thirty, twenty, or
even ten years ago it was fairly commonplace. And today the
police are being better selected and far better trained than in
the earlier years. If this be so-and it is so-than why are the
police being subjected to more and more restrictions in the performance of their duties with respect to the conventional type of
crime and criminals? Why are their judicial "handcuffs" being
squeezed tighter and tighter?
The primary reason, in my opinion, is the public identification of the police as the ones to blame and hold responsible for
the plight of minority groups and the abuses of minority groups.
The policeman is the uniformed symbol of all of these social ills.
He has come to represent a menace in the way of a better life
for the socially deprived.
Any thoughtful reflection will produce a realization that the
police did not produce our slums or our Negro and Puerto Rican ghettos; nor did the police dream up the ideas of segrega-

'Originally printed in 57J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY& P.S. 265 (1966).
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tion and discrimination. Nevertheless, there exists a more or
less unconscious identification of the police as the architects of
it all. I suggest to you that even down South this architectural
responsibility cannot be fairly placed upon the police. To be
sure, they have served as the implements of some of the social
wrongs and oppressions, but they were not the creators of any of
them. I will also suggest to you that even the so-called "redneck" Southern sheriff with his cattle-prod was not acting in a
dictatorial capacity; he was actually serving his community in the
manner in which the community wanted to be served. His exercise of the power of suppression was notassumed; it was conferred upon him, tacitly, if not explicitly. In fixing primary
blame, therefore, place it where it belongs-upon the community at large.
In the development of this attitude, whereby the policeman
is the symbol of suppression and abuses of minority groups, and
in seeking to curb his power, or even to render him harmless in
that respect, the fact has been overlooked that we must depend
upon these same policemen to protect us from the criminal
element in our midst. For that we need his skill, his courageand the legalpowers of his office.
Once we recognize that the police are not the creators of
our social ills with respect to minority groups, and once we realize that we can advance the cause of civil rights without emasculating the police, we can then make a better judgment as to
what restraints should be imposed upon them in the exercise of
their conventional police responsibilities and functions.
Another, though unrelated factor, that has clouded the
thinking of many persons-including some judges, lawyers and
law professors-is the impression many people receive when
they hear about the reversal of a criminal case, and particularly
one reversed by the Supreme Court, on the announced basis of
"police misconduct". The assumption is that the police must
have violated the law or the Constitution itself. To be sure this
has occurred in some of the cases, as when coercive methods
have been used to obtain a confession, but much of what the
public has been hearing about today does not involve that kind
of conduct at all. To the contrary, a number of the most publicized cases have centered about police practices and procedures
that were legally permissible at the time they were employed but
condemned later on as improper. The public itself is seldom
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made aware of this, so down again goes the image of the policeman.
The famous Escobedo case itself furnishes the best example of
the point I am trying to make.' What the police did to Escobedo, and what 5 of the 9 Justices found objectionable, had
been labeled as permissible in two of the Court's own decisions
rendered only 6 years before the Escobedo decision. In Escobedo,
the majority of the Court nullified a confession obtained after
the police had refused to permit Escobedo's lawyer to confer
with him. But at the time of Escobedo's interrogation the police were acting in accordance with the law as the Supreme
Court had said it was in Crooker v. Califomi and Cicenia v. La
Gay,3 both of which were decided by a closely divided court, just
as was Escobedo.
Incidentally, in addition to a reliance upon the Crooker and
Cicenia cases, the police interrogators of Escobedo could have
fortified themselves with the clear and explicit language of the
sixth amendment which provides as follows: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the

assistance of counsel for his defense". There is not one word in
the Constitution or in any of its amendments to the effect that a
suspect has the right to counsel in the police station.
My point is that the police interrogators did not deprive
Danny Escobedo of any constitutional rights as they existed at that
time. But I will hazard a guess that if the public at large were
polled as to whether the decision was based upon the Court's
finding that the police had violated Escobedo's constitutional
rights at the time of the interrogation practically every one of
them would say "yes". They might also be under the impression
that Escobedo had been physically abused, or threatened, or offered promises of leniency.
May I call your attention to another illustration of how the
public acquires an unfavorable impression of the police from
their learning about the reversal of a criminal case because of
"police misconduct".
Much consideration is being given today to the matter of
whether a criminal suspect is entitled to be warned of his selfincrimination privilege at the beginning of a police interrogaEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2357

U.S. 433 (1958).

'357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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don. If and when the Supreme Court reverses a case because
the police had not warned the defendant of his selfincrimination privilege-and I have no doubt that this will occur-the impression the public will receive is that the police
have goofed again. What will not be realized-and not even by
many judges, lawyers and law professors-is that the highest
courts of over thirty states have consistently held that it is unnecessary for the police to issue such a warning. A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court itself many years
ago.5 Only recently have a few state reviewing courts held the
warning to be necessary, and they have done so upon the assumption that the Escobedo opinion requires it, or that the Supreme Court will ultimately hold the warning to be a
constitutional requirement.6
The point I want to make is that in those states which have
not overruled their earlier decisions (that a warning is not necessary) the police cannot fairly be charged with violating the
constitutional right of criminal suspects just because the Supreme Court says later on that the warning must be given.
Now I should like to address myself to the issue as to the
ways and means for checking the police, and also as to who
should have a hand in the process.
In some of my earlier speeches and writings I have expressed the view that it is not the constitutional function of the
Supreme Court to police the police. But even if this responsibility were rightfully within the power of the Court, the objective is
unachievable, largely because the Court is not equipped with
the knowledge, skill, or the ways and means for policing the police. Much of what the Court has been doing or attempting to
do should be left to the legislative and executive branches of
government.
To effectively "police the police," you must tell the police
what to do, as well as tell them what not to do. They must be
' See cases collected in INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 162
(1962).
'Ibid. 163.
'For example, People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965); State v. Neely, 239
Ore. 487, 398 P.2d 482 (1965). Other state appellate courts, despite Escobedo, have continued to
follow their earlier precedents: People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E. 2d 33 (1964), cert.
den. 380 U.S. 961; People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y. 2d 226, 205 N.E. 2d 852 (1965).
[The Court has since held, in its June 13th 5-4 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct.
1602 (1966), that the warning is now a constitutional requirement.]
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given some guidelines. What guidelines have they received
from the Supreme Court?
7
In a case decided some years ago, Trupiano v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that if the police have the time in
which to obtain a search warrant and they fail to do so, the evidence they seize, even pursuant to an otherwise reasonable
search, is inadmissible in court. Two years later, in United States
v. Rabinowitz,8 the Court overruled the earlier case, holding that
even though time permitted, a failure to obtain a search warrant
would not nullify the validity of evidence obtained from an otherwise reasonable search. Eleven years thereafter, in Chapmanv.
United States,9 the Court in effect overruled the second case and
favored the first one, although the Court's language is somewhat ambiguous. In Justice Clark's dissent in this last case he
had this to say:
Every moment of every day, somewhere in the United States, a law
enforcement officer is faced with the problem of search and seizure. He
is anxious to obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field. It
is the duty of this Court to lay down those rules with such clarity and understanding that he may be able to follow them. For some years now the
field has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire. It fashions a novel rule, supporting it with an old theory long since overruled... It is disastrous to law enforcement to leave at large the
inconsistent rules laid down in these cases. It turns the well springs of
democracy-law and order-into a slough of frustration. It turns crime
detection into a game of 'cops and robbers'. We hear much these days
of an increasing crime rate and breakdown in law enforcement. Some
place the blame on police officers. I say there are others that must
shoulder much of that responsibility.

Another outstanding example of the Court's vacillation was

mentioned earlier: the overruling, in the 1964 Escobedo decision,
of two 1958 decisions of Crooker v. California and Cicenia v. La
Gay." Complicating matters, of course, insofar as the police are
concerned, is the fact that Escobedo was a 5-4 decision, as was
the Crooker case. Cicenia was 5-3, with one Justice abstaining;
otherwise it, too, would have been 5-4.
This turning on and off of the spout of constitutionality by a
onejudge margin must inevitably dull the non-lawyer police-

7334 U.S. 699 (1948).
' 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
'365 U.S. 610 (1961).
,Ibid. p. 622.
"Supra notes 2 and 3.
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man's respect for the word "constitutional". To him it cannot
be so sacrosanct if at a given time it means one thing and six
years later it means something else. It is difficult for him to appreciate that this change can be effected by a one man change
of viewpoint. We lawyers are equipped to understand these
phenomena, but it is not easily accepted by non-lawyer policemen.
Further complicating matters, not only for policemen but
also for police training school law instructors-and even for
prosecutors, defense counsel and judges-is the ambiguous
language in the Court's opinions. Consider the confusion that
was created by Justice Goldberg's language in Escobedo. The supreme courts of California and Oregon and some other states
have interpreted it to require a warning of the right to remain
silent and of the right to counsel; in Illinois and NewJersey and
certain other states it has been given a different interpretation.12
Moreover, in New Jersey the federal Circuit Court of Appeals
held contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Court-a situation
that impelled Justice Weintraub of that Court to send out a
"pastoral letter" to all the state judges advising them to follow
of his court rather than that of the federal circuit
the decision
3
court.'

If lawyers and judges can be that confused, pity the poor policeman who is told to be guided by what the Supreme Court
says.
Even within the Supreme Court of the United States itself,
the Justices seem to be confusing each other. Don't take my
word for this; listen, if you will, to what some of the Justices14
themselves had to say in the 1961 case of Columbe v. Connecticut,
a case involving the question of the test to be applied in determining confession admissibility. The majority opinion laid
down this test:
The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was voluntarily or involuntarily made involves, at the least a three-phased process.
First, there is the business of finding the crude historical facts, the external, 'phenomenological' occurrences and events surrounding the
confession. Second, because the concept of 'voluntariness' is one which
concerns a mental state, there is the imaginative recreation, largely in"Supra note 6.
United States ex rel Russo v. NewJersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965). As regards the "pastoral letter", see NewYork Times, Dec. 11, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
"367 U.S. 568 (1961).
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ferential, of internal, 'psychological' fact. Third, there is the application
to this psychological fact of standards for judgment informed by the
larger legal conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but
which, also, comprehend
both induction from, and anticipation of, fac5
tual circumstances.

Chief Justice Warren castigated the writer of the majority
opinion for this attempt at a general "clarification" of the test of
admissibility. He said:
The opinion was unquestionably written with the intention of clarifying these problems and of establishing a set of principles which could
be easily applied in any coerced-confession situation. However, it is
doubtful that such will be the result, for while three members of the
Court agree to the general principles enunciated by the opinion, they
construe those principles as requiring a result in this case exactly the
opposite from that reached by the author of the opinion. This being
true, it cannot be assumed that the lower courts and law enforcement
agencies will receive better guidance from the treatise for which this case
seems to have provided a vehicle. On an abstract level, I find myself in
agreement with some portions of the opinion and in disagreement with
other portions. However, I would prefer not to write on many of the difficult questions which the opinion 6discusses until the facts of a particular
case make such writing necessary.

Do you wonder why some of us are of the view that the Supreme Court is not the agency or group to tell the police what
they can and cannot do? If the views of the Justices cannot be
stated any more clearly than they were in the Columbe case from
which these quotes came, the opinions might just as well be
written in Latin.
In my opinion, a much more suitable agency of government
for providing the police with legal guidelines is the legislative
branch. In fact, much of what some courts have been writing in
the past few years, and particularly the Supreme Court, has
been judicial legislation. And when constitutional justifications
have been invoked, the particular constitutional provisions relied upon have sometimes been twisted far out of shape in order
that the court could impose its own conscience upon the police
and the public as well.
Workable guidelines are beyond the capacity of the courts
to formulate or administer. This is especially true of the Supreme Court. The judiciary also has enough to keep itself fully
occupied at the task of providing procedures to insure fair
criminal trials and to protect the innocent from criminal convic"Ibid. p. 603.
, ibid. p. 635.
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tions. The courts should focus their attention upon such problems as providing defense counsel to those who need it, the discovery rights of the accused and the State, the hazards involved
in eye witness identifications and testimony and the safeguards
that should be established. The latter always presents the spectre of a conviction of the innocent. These are the real and true
functions and responsibilities of the courts.
Much of the concern, energy, and efforts expended by the
judiciary in trying to police the police could be better spent in
getting the judicial house itself in order.
In some of this country's municipal and magistrate courts
there are more and greater risks to the innocent, more trampling over of basic individual rights, and more affronts to human dignity than you will find in the average police station.
Those of you who doubt that should pay a visit to some of these
courts and observe the cafeteria style justice that is dispensed in
them.
Perhaps the reason why the courts prefer to police the police rather than attend to the needs of the judicial house itself is
the same as that which accounts for the fact that it is much easier, and much more pleasant, for any of us parents to think up
ways and means that should be employed in the parental handling of the neighbor's children than it is to correct the faults
and control the mischief of our own.
Why do I suggest that the legislature is the better governmental agency for providing guidelines for the police?
In considering any or all phases of police conduct or procedures in the enforcement of the law, a legislature may establish
commissions and appoint committees to make studies, and formulate proposals. Hearings could be conducted, during the
course of which opposing viewpoints would be presented and
evaluated. At such hearings, persons and groups with a broad
interest in the subject matter could be heard. Spokesmen for
the police interests would be present, along with representatives
of citizen organizations, minority groups, and others. These
various viewpoints would not be so confined as they are in a
court case situation, where ordinarily only counsel for the
prosecution and defense are heard, and then primarily with regard to the case facts and the law applicable to those particular
facts. Ultimately a legislative decision would be reached which
is based upon considerations of policy and practicality, unaffected by the shocking facts of an isolated case. I believe there
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would be greater objectivity in such legislative decision making.
I also believe it would be more in keeping with the traditions of
a democratic form of government than much of the decision
making that is now occurring in the Supreme Court, where all
too frequently the vote of a single Justice will determine what
the police may or may not do in the performance of their duties.
Legislatures could also avail themselves of the efforts of
non-legislative groups such as the American Law Institute, or
the A.B.A.'s Committee on Minimum Standards of CriminalJustice. The recently drafted proposed Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, submitted by the Council of the American Law Institute, represents a far better and more workable set of controls
over the police than anything that has thus far emanated from
the Supreme Court. All of the American Law Institute's efforts
may go for naught, however, if the Supreme Court should decide that there is a constitutional prohibition against the detention and interrogation of a criminal suspect unless he has an
attorney at his side.
Incidentally, the proposed Model Code is somewhat of a testimonial to the importance of police interrogations in the investigation of criminal offenses. And this brings me to the next
point I wish to make with reference to Professor Packer's paper.
He cites a statistical study made by Justice Nathan R. Sobel of
Kings County, N.Y. which purports to show that interrogations
and confessions are of little significance or value, implying that
the police can function effectively without interrogating criminal suspects. ButJustice Sobel's interpretation of his statistics is
highly invalid. He surveyed 1000 indictments filed in King's
County Court during a certain period and found that only in 86
of them did the prosecutor file the prescribed "notice of intention" to use a confession, as required by New York procedure.
From this Justice Sobel concluded that "any estimate that confessions were involved in any large percentage of cases or particular cases was a gross exaggeration". What he overlooked,
however, and this is pointed out in the commentary to section
5.01 of the proposed Model Code (f.n.6), is that the "notice of
intention" is filed only when a case is not disposed of by a plea
of guilty, and that such notices are not filed in cases where the
defendant's confession led to other convincing evidence of guilt
and the confession's use at the trial was considered to be unnecessary.
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Contrast Justice Sobel's statistics with those gathered by the
highly respected District Attorney of New York County, Frank S.
Hogan. Mr. Hogan has reported that of 100 murderers who
were executed in New York between 1943 and 1961, 85 of them
had given statements to the police which were significantly helpful in their prosecution. Of the currently pending cases in New
York County, involving 91 defendants charged with criminal
homicide, incriminating admissions were made by 62 of them.
Hogan also reports that 25 of these defendants could not have
been indicted had it not been for the confessions they had
made to the police.
More and more we are hearing of statistics and conclusions
just as invalid as Justice Sobel's. My own feeling is that there are
some things we can and should accept without demanding statistical proof, and the necessity for police interrogation is one of
them. A reflection upon the types of crimes that confront our
metropolitan police today should convince anyone that many
such cases cannot be solved by any other means than the interrogation of criminal suspects.
Now I should like to get to the matter of civilian review
boards as a means of controlling the police. Professor Packer
urges the police to accept this concept, for their own interest
and welfare as well as for that of the public.
If we were able to assemble, as a review board, a group of civilians who were objective, fair-minded, and also knowledgeable
with respect to the police behavior problems perhaps such a
board would be a good thing-provided, however, an additional
element is added: a firm commitment by the civil rights and civil
liberties groups to accept the findings and recommendations of
such a board. All these conditions are not likely to be met, and
unless they are, I disagree with Professor Packer as to the desirability of this device as a control over the police.
There would be little agitation for civilian review boards if
the concern were solely with police behavior in the investigation
of the ordinary types of criminal offenses. Some evidence of
this is found in the review board experience of Rochester, N.Y.
During the period of a little over one year from the establishment of the Board and the riots ofJuly 1964, ,the Board received
only two official complaints against the police for unnecessary
force. As a matter of fact, because of the inactivity of the Board,
"For illustrations, see KAMISAR, INBAU &ARNOLD, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN OURTIME 99 (1965).
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the city administration was contemplating its abolition. When
the riots occurred, and the civil rights groups complained of police brutality as the cause of the riots, the city administration
and the police departments were able to cite the low incidence
of prior complaints of unnecessary force. Thereafter the complaints increased very considerably, and suspicion arose that
perhaps the increase was due to the solicitation of some Board
members in order to justify the Board's continued existence. It
is my understanding that the Rochester police department has
in its files a number of sworn depositions of complainants verifying the fact of such solicitations.
The only other city with a police review board at the present
time is Philadelphia. What has been the experience there? The
Board, consisting of civilians only, has been in existence for approximately 7 years. From October 1958 through January 1965
the board received 725 complaints. 333 were resolved to the
satisfaction of the complainant without conducting hearings. In
38 cases disciplinary action was recommended, in 15 of which
there were suspensions up to 30 days, and in 23, official reprimands. In all the remaining cases the board made no recommendations against the police.
What was the reaction of the civil rights groups regarding
the Philadelphia Board? The president of the Philadelphia
branch , 18of the NAACP is reported as saying: "It ain't worth a
damn!"

The feelings and tensions are such throughout the country
today that, in my opinion, no police review board would be acceptable to minority groups generally unless it were composed
of a majority of members who are in full sympathy with their
demands and based upon their concept of proper police behavior.' 9 The disturbing feature about a compliance with their demands is the fact that some of the top leaders of the civil rights
movement have been openly condoning-and even advocatSee NewYork Herald Tribune, Feb. 20, 1966.
Several days after the Northwestern University Conference at which this statement was

made, the General Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People rejected the civilian police review board plan proposed by Liberal-Republican Mayor Lindsay
of NewYork City. It was said that there were "serious inadequacies" in the plan, even though the
New York Civil Liberties Union considered the plan as "not ideal but certainly a giant step forward". The National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality objected to the plan on the
ground that the panel that Mayor Lindsay appointed to nominate members of the review board
"fails to include representatives from the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant ghettos and civil rights
organizations". NewYork Times, May 4, 1966, and May 5, 1966.
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ingm-unlawful conduct in the promotion of the civil rights
cause.
I can fully appreciate the concern of the police in not wanting their conduct appraised by persons who subscribe to the notion that a righteous cause justifies the use of unlawful conduct
to achieve the desired objective.
In our efforts to preserve individual civil rights and liberties,
we cannot abolish the police and other law enforcement agencies and still survive as an orderly society; nor can we impose so
many restrictions upon them that they will be practically powerless to prevent crime and apprehend criminals. Our only alternative is to retain our police forces and other law enforcement
agencies and try to act directly in improving their quality, their
efficiency, and their respect for individual civil rights and liberties. It must be done through a system whereby our police are
selected and promoted on a merit basis, properly trained, adequately compensated, internally supervised with respect to abusive and corrupt practices, and permitted to remain
substantially free from politically inspired interference. At the
hands of policemen within such a system there will be a minimum of abusive practices, regardless of the race, color, creed,
or social status of the persons who become involved in processes
of the criminal law. Individual rights and civil liberties can survive-and indeed flourish-in such an atmosphere. At the
same time there will be the protective security the public needs
and deserves.
I want to close with a statement made a short while ago by
Commissioner G. B. McClellan of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police. It expresses his sentiment as well as mine:
When the policeman exceeds his authority, bring him up short, but
when he is doing, as most of them are doing, a tough, thankless and frequently dangerous job for you and for all you hold dear, for God's sake
get off his back.

"An address delivered to the Canadian Club of Toronto, Ontario, on March 29, 1965.

